混合寡占之下的负外部性对策:国有化兼并还是行政监管——兼评山西省煤炭业资源重组方案

Nationalizing Mergers or Supervision under a Mixed Oligopoly with Negative Externalities: A Theoretical Framework and Analysis of a Coal Resources Rearrangement Project in Shanxi Province

金融危机之后国有化现象大有卷土重来之势,而现有研究主要专注于产权私有化对效率的改善,对此则解释力不足。本文认为国有化的根本原因在于生产的负外部性,并基于这一判断构建了存在生产负外部性的多厂商混合寡占的一般模型框架,探讨国有化兼并与行政监管孰为最优之解决策略。继而依据本文模型分析山西省煤炭业资源重组方案,认为该方案值得进一步商榷。

Renationalization occurs all over the world company with subprime crisis. However, common ownership theories can＇t make a convictive explanation to it for they focused on privatization other than nationalization. Holding the idea that negative externalities should be the root cause, this paper builds a mixed oligopolistic model with negative productive externalities, and try to find out among government supervision and nationalizing merger and the combination of the above two which should be best policy in the interest of social welfare. And base on this framework this paper analyze the program on the rearrangement of coal resources in Shanxi Province, and indicate more consideration should be took in.