摘要
以供应商和零售商组成的二阶段供应商管理库存(VMI)供应链系统为研究对象,考虑随机需求下的VMI系统中可能存在的滞销成本或缺货惩罚,建立了传统、Stackelberg博弈、Nash协商的3种收益共享机制的协调模型,并得出Nash协商能完美协调分散式VMI供应链的结论.最后,通过数值算例对相关结论进行了验证和分析.
Taking the two-stage vendor managed inventory （VMI） supply chain system composed of suppliers and retailers as the research object,considering the possibility of unsalable cost or out punishment under the stochastic demand of the VMI system,a coordination model with three kinds of revenue sharing mechanisms of traditional,Stackelberg game and Nash negotiation is built up.It is derived that Nash negotiation can coordinate distributed VMI supply chain perfectly.Finally,through numerical examples,the relevant conclusions are verified and analyzed.
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第1期137-140,144,共5页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70771034)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20060359007)
关键词
供应商管理库存
收益共享
Nash协商
供应链协调
Vendor managed inventory
Revenue sharing
Nash negotiation
Supply chain coordination
