基于动态理论的食品行业监督博弈分析——以“三鹿事件”为例

Food Industry Monitoring Game Analysis Based on Dynamic Theory

把"三鹿事件"模型化为一个鲜奶供应者、企业和政府的3方动态博弈。在特定的假设条件下,分析了各博弈方在不同情形下的支付,并指出不同情形下各博弈方的最优策略。在各博弈方最优策略的说明下,结合现实,说明了出现这一问题的根本原因和解决建议。并从"三鹿事件"个例上升到整个食品行业,分析食品行业的监督博弈。

＂Sanlu incident＂ was modeled into three participants as a supplier of fresh milk, the company and the govermnent＇ s dynamic game. In the specific assumptions, the payment in different circumstances of the game was analyzed, and the game＇ s optimal strategies under different circumstances were pointed out. Under the interpretation of these optimal strategies and combined with reality, the root causes and solutions for the case were discussed. Finally, monitoring game on food industry was analyzed from ＂Sanlu incident＂.