金融危机下大股东大宗交易行为的实证分析

An Empirical Analysis on the Block Transfers by Large Shareholders Under the Circumstances of Financial Crisis in China

通过对2006-2008年的138个大股东大宗增、减持公告数据进行实证分析,发现:大股东大宗交易行为能缓解金融危机下投资者羊群行为和过度反应,改善系统性和结构性市场定价效率;股权分置改革后,股权制衡度较高公司的控股股东倾向于增持,说明控制权竞争现象逐渐显现,这有益于外部治理机制改善;外部大股东没有起到被国外实证结果验证的惩罚低效管理的作用。应对大股东,尤其是外部大股东交易行为加强监管,保护中小股东利益。

Through the investigation of block transfers by using the data of 138 large shareholders from 2006 to 2008 in China, we find that market trend adversely affects block purchase, while corporate performance affects it positively. It benefits the marketing efficiency. Block increases by the largest shareholder occur more frequently in companies with lower ownership eoneentration. It reinforces corporate governance. External large shareholders do not help regulate the poor performance as a failure in testing the empirical results. In response to large shareholders, especially the block transfers of the outside large shareholders, it is imperative to carry out corresponding regulations while protecting the interest and profit of the medium and small shareholders.