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农民为什么容易受政策歧视 被引量:13

Why Farmers Are Discriminated in Policymaking
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摘要 在民主和法治国家,公共决策是透明的,制度留给利益集团逐利的空间极为有限,社会对执政者惩罚的承诺是可信的。因此,利益集团影响政策制定的能力是被严格约束的。而且,各利益集团具有平等的机会,形成相互制约的均势。统治集团能实行歧视和剥夺政策,或者是因为它拥有绝对暴力优势;或者是因为它采取分而治之策略,瓦解了社会其他集团的结盟;或者是因为它收买了某一强势集团,两者联合起来压迫社会其他成员。在斯大林时代的苏联和毛泽东时代的中国,之所以通过剥夺和歧视农民的方式推进工业化,是因为它恰好契合了当时政策制定者的意识形态。 In a state,which is democratic and ruled by law,public decision is transparent,the room left by institutions for interest groups to seek for profit is strictly limited,and the promise of punishing a politician or official who misconducts himself is credible.So,the ability of an interest group's affecting on policymaking is seriously restricted.Moreover,all interest groups are equal and their behavior is conditioned by competition.Deprival and discrimination only happen in autarchical countries.The ruling group can practice deprival and discrimination policies for the following reasons:(1) It has absolute advantage in violence;(2) It takes strategy of divide-and-rule and has destroyed other groups' alliance;(3) It suborns a strong group and they join up to oppress the other members of the society.In Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China,farmers were deprived and discriminated for promoting industrialization as this cruel policy tallies with policymakers' ideology.
作者 谭秋成
出处 《中国农村观察》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第1期2-14,共13页 China Rural Survey
基金 作者主持的中国社会科学院重大项目"我国农村政策的制定程序与实施机制研究"的部分内容
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参考文献38

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二级参考文献34

  • 1谭秋成.乡镇集体企业在中国的历史起源——一个经济组织与产权制度相关的案例[J].中国经济史研究,1999(2):88-98. 被引量:7
  • 2谭秋成.财政考核、制度租金榨取与乡镇债务[J].中国农村观察,2004(6):2-13. 被引量:23
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