基于委托-代理机制的电力企业污染治理研究

Research on Pollution Control of Power Enterprises Based on Principal-Agent Mechanism

本文将Holmstrom-Milgrom模型运用到电力企业环境治理分析中,并在模型中植入了代表电力企业改善环境的边际效率的新变量,然后比较了具有不同治污效率的企业的最优确定性等价收入、治污努力水平、总代理成本。在理论模型的基础上进行模拟,得出以下结论:信息不完全降低了电力企业的治污努力水平;电力企业的治污效率越高,其代理成本对监督风险水平的变动越敏感。基于上述结论,给出了相应的政策建议。

This paper applies Holmstrom-Milgrom model to the analysis on environment management of China＇s power enterprises,and introduces a new variable, namely the marginal efficiency of environmental improvement of power enterprises into this model. Then,it compares optimal certainty equivalent revenue ,effort level of controlling pollution and total agent cost of power enterprises with different efficiency of controlling pollution. It draws the following conclusions based on the theoretical model：the incomplete information causes the fall of pollution control effort of power enterprises;the higher the efficiently of controlling pollution of power enterprises,the more sensitive the total agent cost for the level of monitoring risk. Finally, it gives some corresponding policy recommendations.