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考虑固定收益率的采购拍卖投标策略研究 被引量:1

Study on Bidding Strategies in Procurement Auction with Fixed-income Rate
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摘要 本文分析了单物品多因素采购拍卖中的供应商投标问题,在考虑供应商存在固定收益率的前提下,建立了相应的多因素拍卖中存在固定收益率的投标策略模型。本模型在Che建立的多因素拍卖打分函数模型的基础上,引入Lorentziadis考虑的固定收益率。分析表明,模型中存在3种类型的供应商,且各类供应商具有相应的投标策略。同时,分析了不同类型的供应商的投标策略与其市场竞争力之间的相互关系。 This paper analyzes the bidding strategies in a procurement auction with single item and multi-attribute, and establishes the corresponding bidding strategy model with suppliers fixed income rate. This model combines the conception of fixed income rate in Lorentziadis with the scoring function of multi-attribute auction in Che. The result shows that there exist three types of suppliers and various bidding strategies respectively. Further,it explores the relationship between bidding strategies and market competitiveness.
作者 黄河 涂维
出处 《技术经济》 2010年第1期118-121,共4页 Journal of Technology Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"多因素采购组合拍卖机制设计研究"(70701040)
关键词 采购拍卖 固定收益率 投标策略 procurement auction fixed income rate bidding strategy
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参考文献5

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共引文献6

同被引文献6

  • 1Bichler M, Kalagnanam J. Configurable effers an winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. European Journal of Operational Re- search. 2005 ;160(2) :380-394.
  • 2Bichler M. An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auction. Deci- sion Support Systems,2000;(29) :249-268.
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  • 4Branco F. The design of multidimensional auctions. Rand Journal of Economics,1997 ; 28( 1 ) :63-81.
  • 5Bichler M. An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auction. Deci- sion Support Systems,2000, (29) :249-268.
  • 6David E. Bidding in sealed-bid and English muhi-attribute auctions. Decision Support Systems,2006; (42) :527-556.

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