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行为人具有涉他偏好的锦标激励研究 被引量:3

Study on Tournament Incentive under Other-regarding Preference
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摘要 行为经济学和心理博弈论研究认为行为人具有涉他偏好,关注自身收益的同时也会关注其他人的收益状况,在此基础上已建立了包含嫉妒和自豪等心理因素的效用模型。本文将涉他偏好理论模型引入锦标激励研究中。研究结果显示,涉他偏好对代理人产生更高的事前激励作用,在加剧代理人间竞争的同时还改变了代理人的期望收益及委托人的利润实现,从而对锦标赛制的最优工资结构和业绩评价精度产生影响。在锦标赛制设计时考虑涉他偏好,能够更好地预测行为人的行为规律,可据此制定更加行之有效的锦标激励机制。 The experiments on behavioral economics and psychology game theory indicate that all people are not egoistical, and they not only pursue their private profits, but also are concerned about others' income. Based on this premise, some utility models considering the factors of jealous and egotistic have been built. According to this premise of other regarding preference of behavioral economics, this paper studies some new tournament models. The results from these researches prove that the other-regarding preference can improve the ex-ante incentives of agent. This factor can not only promote the competition between agents,but also can alter the expected income of agent and the profit of principal,and then influences tbe optimal prize structure and the precision of underlying information structure. When designing the tournament methods,the factor of other-regarding preference are of advantage to predict people's behavioral regularities, which helps to make more successful mechanisms of tournament incentive.
出处 《技术经济》 2010年第1期122-127,共6页 Journal of Technology Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金项目"和谐社会的微观经济理论研究"(07BJY017)
关键词 锦标激励 涉他偏好 tournament incentive other-regarding preference
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