摘要
在对跨国技术转移现实问题进行识别的基础上,运用契约设计理论,参照完全信息下的最优技术转移合约的研究,分析和探讨了不完全信息条件下次优技术转移合约的特征。次优技术转移合约特征显示:在技术信息高度不对称条件下,东道国企业(委托人)应该通过支付一个超额的市场收益分成(信息租)来激励外方企业(代理人)增加对合约中可证实显性知识的转移,同时相应降低对隐性知识需求期望和支付水平。在满足激励相容约束的次优技术转移合约机制下,代理人的道德风险行为将得到有效控制。
This paper analyzed and discussed the characteristics of second best technology transfer contract under incomplete information based on the identification towards realistic problems of multinational technology transfer, through using contract design method of mechanism design theory and comparison study on best technology transfer contract under complete information. The characteristics of second best technology transfer contract demonstrated that host country enterprise （principal） had better pay an extra market revenue share （information rent） to stimulate MNC （agent） transfer the patent technology, and decline the demand and payoff for the know - how technology, and under the second best technology contract mechanism that satisfies the ineentive compatibility constrains, the agent＇ s moral hazard behaviors caused by incomplete information would be effectively controlled.
出处
《科学学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期104-109,32,共7页
Studies in Science of Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571036)
关键词
信息租
隐性知识
显性知识
次优技术转移合约
information rent
know-how technology
patent technology
second best technology transfer contract
