摘要
逆向供应链作为生产者延伸责任制实施的载体,各企业间的组织协调性直接关系着生产商延伸责任制的实施效果。基于此,将逆向供应链抽象为一个制造商和一个回收商组成的价值链模型,应用委托代理理论,研究信息对称与不对称的情况下制造商和回收商之间的利益博弈,并分析不同因素对制造商和回收商期望收入的影响。
As the carrier of EPR,the coordinated development of reverse supply chain can effectively implement the EPR.Based on it,the reverse supply chain is abstracted as a model composed of a manufacturer and a recycling businessman.Using principal-agent theory,the paper studies benefit gambling of the manufacturer and the recycling businessman when information is in asymmetrical and asymmetrical conditions,and analyzes some factors that affect expected income.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期80-83,共4页
Commercial Research
基金
重庆市社科基金项目
项目编号:2006-JJ18
重庆理工大学博士科研启动基金项目
项目编号:2009ZD03
关键词
生产者延伸责任
逆向供应链
激励机制
委托代理
extended producer responsibility
reverse supply chain
incentive mechanisms
principal-agent
