摘要
沿用效率工资理论的基本思想,通过建立数理模型来分析企业的试用期薪酬问题。基本结论是,当企业选择较高的试用期劳动薪酬时,则试用者付出的劳动投入也较高,如果被雇用,则其劳动价值也更高;当企业制定了较高的雇佣劳动薪酬时,则可适当降低试用期的劳动薪酬,反之,则要制定较高的试用期劳动薪酬;雇用合同期限相对试用期的长短对试用期劳动薪酬的关系不确定。
The article builds a mathematical model based on the efficient wage theory to analyze firms＇ probationership wage issues. It is concluded that probationers will put more efforts to work when firms set higher probationership wage,and they will also generate higher work value when hired. When firms set higher employment wage,a lower probationership wage can be offered,and vice versa. The relation between the relative length of probationership to employment contract term and probationership wage is uncertain.
出处
《科技与管理》
2010年第1期141-143,共3页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
2008广东省教育厅人文社会科学项目(WYM08017)
