摘要
基于中国上市公司2003-2007年的面板数据,对大股东利益侵占与股权激励实施效应之间的关系问题的研究发现:大股东对中小股东利益的侵占将损害股权激励实施效应,对上市公司业绩带来负向影响;内部人控制问题进一步加重了大股东侵占的代理成本,对股权激励实施效应带来负向影响。这也说明,集中的股权结构下,股权激励在解决现代企业委托代理问题上无显著效果。
Based on the panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2007, by analyzing impact of shareholders encroachment on equity incentive, the research shows that conflict of interest between major shareholders and minority shareholders in China's listed companies is harmful to effect of equity incentive and has negative impact on the performance of the listed company. The study also demonstrates that insider control will increase entrenchment effect and has negative impact on equity Incentive effect. In a word, equity incentive is not an effective means of solving shareholders conflict under concentrated ownership structure.
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2010年第1期35-38,共4页
Economy and Management
关键词
大股东侵占
股权激励
公司业绩
major shareholders encroachment
equity incentive
corporate performance