摘要
1938年的三次"近卫声明",都是日本政府为找到一个代表中国的谈判对手达到其侵略的目标而发布的。第一次近卫声明打开了诱降的大门,第二次、第三次近卫声明则是在日本大规模侵华军事进攻告一段落和汪精卫暗通日本的情况下发布的,完全体现了政治谋略为主、军事进攻为辅的方针,目的在于从政治上瓦解国民政府。三次近卫声明之中,以第二次近卫声明影响最为巨大而深远。
The 3 Konoe statements in 1938 were all issued by Japanese government which wanted to find a negotiating target representing China to realize their aim for invasive interests. The first Konoe statement opened the door of luring surrender. The second and third Konoe statements were issued during the pause of Japan massive military aggression against China and in the context of Wang Ching-wei's secretly intrigue with Japan, entirely reflecting the guiding principles of mainly political strategy while military offensive subsidiary, to disintegrate National Government from politics. In the 3 Konoe Statements, the second one had tremendous and profound influence.
出处
《阅江学刊》
2010年第1期98-103,共6页
Yuejiang Academic Journal
关键词
抗战
近卫声明
汪精卫
对华政策
东亚新秩序
Anti-Japanese War
Konoe Statements
Wang Ching-wei
foreign policy towards China
a new order in East Asia