摘要
研究重点在于探讨台湾上市公司治理结构是否会影响公司财务报告品质可靠性。由于台湾上市公司的核心代理问题主要来自控制股东与小股东之间的利益冲突。本文预期,控制股东会通过盈余管理达到门坎。实证结果发现,代理问题较严重的公司,裁决性应计项目较大,并会通过盈余管理跨越前期盈余门坎,造成财务报告信息可靠性降低。相较于其他类型的控制股东,具有家族色彩的控制股东较会通过盈余管理达到门坎,并降低财务信息品质可靠性。
This study examines the association between the corporate governance structure of listed companies and the quality of financial report in Taiwan. The core agency problem is the interest conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Taiwan. We expect that controlling shareholders will manipulate for self-interest to meeting earnings threshold. The empirical evidence shows that for firms with more serious agency problems, their discretionary accruals are larger. Meanwhile, they tend to manage earnings in order to exceed their prior earnings threshold, thus decreasing the reliability of their financial report. Finally, this study exhibits that family-controlled shareholders are more likely to engage in earnings management compared with other types of shareholders.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期3-17,共15页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
中国台湾“国科会”计划财务的支持
关键词
控制股东
公司治理结构
所有权结构
盈余门坎
controlling shareholders
corporate governance structure
ownership structure
earnings threshold