模型不确定性条件下的货币政策决策分析

The Analysis of the Monetary Policy Decision under Model Uncertainty

为什么中央银行在制定货币政策时往往是比较谨慎或保守的?从具体的货币政策规则的经验估计如泰勒规则看,这些货币政策比具体经济模型所要求的最优货币政策更为保守。本文从模型不确定性及决策者对不确定性态度变化的角度,运用美联储数据进行实证来解释这一现象。经过分析发现,若与降低利率的变动相比,央行更为关心产出缺口的稳定性,则央行对模型不确定呈厌恶或呈中性将会大大降低泰勒规则中的反应系数,随之产生较为保守的货币政策,若央行对不确定性呈偏好,则产生较为积极的货币政策。

Why does the central bank always take a less aggressive monetary policy？ The empirical monetary rule such as Taylor rule is less aggressive than the optimal monetary policy. This text analyzes the phenomena through the analyzing the degree of the aversion of the central bank to the model uncertainty and the demonstration of the Federal Reserve System. The author finds that if the central bank cares strongly enough about stabilizing the output gap, the attitude of aversion or neutrality to model uncertainty generates significant declines in the coefficients of the Taylor rule, in other worse, it would like to take a less aggressive policy, and the attitude to model uncertainty generates more aggressive monetary policy.