独立董事制度有效性与控股股东关联交易——来自深交所制造业上市公司的经验数据

Effectiveness of Independent Director and Related Transactions of Controlling Shareholders

基于2002～2008年深交所制造业上市公司的证据,本文以控股股东与上市公司之间的关联交易作为研究对象,结合独立董事所占比例、专业性和薪酬等基本特征,考察了独立董事能否有效发挥其监督职能。研究发现:独立董事的专业性对控股股东与上市公司的关联交易有显著的抑制作用,独立董事薪酬与控股股东与上市公司关联交易的频率显著正相关,独立董事的比例对控股股东与上市公司关联交易没有显著影响。这些结论有助于我们从新的视角去改进我国上市公司独立董事制度以提高其监督制约控股股东的职能。

This article empirically studies the relationships between effectiveness of independent director and related party transactions of controlling shareholder by using data of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Markets during 2002-2008. The paper finds that the professional background of independent director has significant constraint effect on the related transaction between controlling shareholders and listed companies; the salary has significant positive relation to the related transaction s; the ration of independent director has no significant effect. The result will contribute to improve the independent director system to monitor the controlling share- holder.