廉价交谈文献综述

Literature Review on Cheap Talk

廉价交谈指的是没有直接支付后果的言论,它与经济理论的协调问题密切相关。本文概述了廉价交谈在协调问题中的作用,它起作用的关键在于言论是否"自我信号显示"和"自我执行";综述了相关实验研究的成果;梳理了廉价交谈在共谋理论中的作用,即对达成共谋协议与卡特尔的作用和影响;最后对廉价交谈与机制设计、默契共谋等的关系以及反垄断法实践等问题进行了简要评述。

Cheap talk refers to plays＇ messages that have no direct payoffs implications, and it is closely related to coordination problems of economic theory. This paper surveys the effect of cheap talk in the coordination problem. When cheap talk works, players＇ messages are ＂self-signaling＂ and ＂self-committing＂. Experimental evidence relating to cheap talk is overviewed. This paper also reviews the effect of cheap talk in the theory of collusion, that is how cheap talk affects the formation of collusion and cartel. Finally, the relations of cheap talk and mechanism design, tacit collusion, and practice problems of anti-trust law of China, are shortly commented.