摘要
通过将经理人员薪酬、经理从事管理防御活动所能获取额外收益、以及经理任期等因素作为经理管理防御的主要动机,建立了在现有激励条件下影响经理管理防御水平的理论模型,讨论了这些影响因素对经理管理防御水平的影响机理,以及这些因素之间的互动作用关系;对于探求降低经理管理防御水平的有效途径,解释企业经理人复杂管理行为提供了新的思路。
Through managerial personnel salary,the additional revenue obtained by managers engaged in the entrenchment activities as well as manager tenure and other factors served as managerial entrenchment motivations,this paper establishes the theoretical model of managerial entrenchment based on the existing incentives conditions,and discusses how these factors affect the managerial entrenchment level and the reciprocal effect among these factors so as to provide an effective way for the managers to seek for ways of lowering managerial entrenchment level as well as a new idea for explaining the complexity management behaviors of managers.
出处
《西安理工大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2009年第4期497-500,共4页
Journal of Xi'an University of Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872092)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(200807000009)
关键词
经理管理防御
代理成本
动机
效用
managerial entrenchment
agency costs
motivation
utility