摘要
基于演化博弈和集理论方法,给出显性价格战得以持续的必要条件,显性价格战只会发生在需求价格弹性均大于1的替代品之间。指出在某些情况下可以通过行政干预有效避免显性价格战的发生,并给出能够有效进行行政干预的前提条件,即当竞争产品的需求价格弹性在1和2之间时,行政管理部门可以通过影响竞争企业的初始禀赋来避免显性价格战的发生。
Price war can bring catastrophe to an industry. This paper, based on evolutionary game analysis and fuzzy set QCA,brings up a necessary condition for explicit price war enduring, that is the demand price elasticity of products must larger than one. In addition, some price war can be avoid by administration intervening. In some mature industry,when products demand price elasticity is between 1 and 2,it is proper for administrators to do some intervening.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
北大核心
2010年第1期7-10,36,共5页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
中国博士后基金资助项目(20080430692)
上海市教育委员会重点学科建设资助项目(J51702)
关键词
价格战
演化均衡
需求价格弹性
price war
evolutionary equilibrium
demand price elasticity
