桀骜不驯的经验——卡尔纳普的语言架构理论和蒯因的本体论承诺理论比较

Carnap's Theory of Language Form VS.Quine's Theory of Ontological Commitment

蒯因的本体论承诺理论,就是区分说什么东西存在和什么东西实际存在这两类问题。卡尔纳普的语言架构理论区分了内部问题和外部问题,这基本上说的是和蒯因相同的意思。但是,卡尔纳普的语言架构理论依赖他的证实原则作为基础,而证实原则又是蒯因所不能赞同、并严厉批判的。卡尔纳普将语言架构理论和证实原则混在一起,不仅产生矛盾,而且揭示出他的语言架构理论只在表面上和蒯因的本体论承诺理论类似,二者其实有本质区别。这里的区别不仅反映出还原论与整体论的对立,也反映出二人对待实用主义的态度。卡尔纳普将实用主义态度局限在科学内部不同科学理论之间,蒯因则将实用主义态度扩展到科学之外,甚至包括宗教与神话。

Quine＇s theory of ontological commitment aims to distinguish question of saying there is something and question of what there exists. According to Carnap＇s theory of language form, which says the same thing as Quine, there is distinction of interior question and exterior question. However, Carnap~ theory of language form depends on his principle of verification which cannot be accepted and is strictly criticized by Quine. In addition to the presentational contradiction, Carnap＇s efforts in combining theory of language form and principle of verification also illustrate that his theory of language form merely resembles Quine＇s theory of ontological commitment apparently. They are fundamentally different. The difference is not only about conflicts between reductionism and holism, but also concerning attitude to pragmatism. Carnap＇s pragmatism is merely confined within science and applied only to different scientific theories. By contrast, Quine expands his pragmatism beyond science to religions and myths.