大股东控制、私有收益与多元化经营

Controlling Shareholder,Private Benefits and Corporate Diversification

基于控制权私人收益对财务决策行为影响的视角,将大股东控制、私有收益与多元化经营纳入一个分析框架进行分析,结果表明,大股东控制下攫取私有收益的水平会对多元化经营程度产生正向影响。进一步的分组分析发现,控股股东的控制权与现金流权分离程度越大,攫取私有收益对多元化经营的影响越明显;而控股股东性质不同时,攫取私有收益对多元化经营的影响并不存在差异。因此,要降低无效多元化经营,根本的是要降低上市公司的控制权私有收益。

Based on the angle of the influence of controlling private gain on financial decision behavior, this paper uses one framework to analyze controlling shareholder, private benefits and corporate diversification. The results indicate that private benefits under controlling shareholder is significantly positive with corporate diversification, that the higher the degree of separation between the control right and the cash right is, the higher corporate diversification driven by the private benefits and that the relationship between private benefits and corporate diversification is the same under the different ultimate controllers. Thus ineffective diversification business should be decreased and the basic efforts are to decrease private gain of controlling right of listed companies.