上市公司并购整合效率的影响因素新探

A New Analysis on the Influencing Factors of Listed Companies Integration of Performance

已有研究并购效率的文献大多局限于并购交易效率,而忽略了并购整合效率,实际上两者的性质是不一样的。本文首次区分并购交易效率与并购整合效率,并分析了影响并购整合效率的因素,重点讨论了政府干预、代理成本对并购整合效率的影响。实证发现:并购后不同阶段的整合具有不同的重点和难点,整合必须分清主次、循序渐进;并购活动中的代理成本显著降低了并购整合效率,但国有上市公司与民营上市公司的表现形式因代理成本差异而有所不同;政府干预始终是影响并购整合效率的重要因素。政府出于政策性负担或政治目标通过并购活动来支持或掠夺其控制的企业,对盈利国有上市公司的并购整合产生负面影响,对亏损国企产生正面影响,而对民企的并购整合影响不显著。

Most literatures analyze the MA performance,and do not distinguish between the MA performance and its integration performance.In fact,the nature of the two is not the same.This paper differentiates the MA transaction efficiency and the MA integration efficiency,and has empirically analyzed the influence factor of MA integration efficiency,and focused on government intervention agency costs on the impact of MA integration performance.we find： a.merger integration at different stages has the different conformity key and the difficulty,so integration must be to distinguish between primary and secondary,and must be progressive;b.the MA agency costs significantly reduce the efficiency of the MA integration,but the manifestations of state-owned and private listed companies vary due to differences in agency costs;c.the Government intervention has always been the important factor of MA integration efficiency.As to the policy burden or political goals,the government supports or plunders its control of enterprises through MA activities.Government intervention on the profitability of state-owned listed companies has a negative impact on MA integration;and has a positive impact on MA integration of loss-making state-owned enterprises.Government intervention with private MA integration,however,is not significantly affected.