纵向市场结构与买方抗衡势力研究

On Vertical Market Structure and Buyer Countervailing Power

本文重新界定双重垄断、双边垄断、双侧垄断等不同类型的纵向市场结构,考察当存在双边垄断的时候,在双侧垄断与单侧垄断竞争格局下零售商买方垄断势力日益增长的福利后果有何不同。研究发现,在双侧垄断情形下,从消费者福利角度考虑,纵向一体化结果优于纵向分离结果,而在单侧垄断的情形下,纵向分离结果则反过来优于纵向一体化结果,因此单侧垄断(或者说单侧竞争)的纵向市场结构有效地克服了双重加价问题,此时买方抗衡势力假说有一定的说服力。考虑到跨期因素,这一结论尤为可信。

The paper redefines different types of vertical market structure, such as double monopoly, bilateral monopoly, and two-sided monopoly. The core issue can be stated as follows： When there is bilateral monopoly, what are the differences between two-sided monopoly and one-sided monopoly as far as welfare consequences of retailers＇ rising buyer power are concerned. The results show that in tow-sided monopoly situation, from consumer welfare perspective, the results of vertical integration are better than the results of vertical separation, whereas in one-sided monopoly situation, the results of vertical separation are better than the results of vertical integration, so the vertical market structure of one-sided monopoly or one-sided competition effectively overcomes double marginalization problem, to counter the forces at this time the buyer countervailing power hypothesis is somewhat reasonable. Taking Inter-period factor into account, this conclusion is even more credible.