过度激励与企业业绩——基于边际递减效应和中国上市公司高管团队的研究

Excessive Incentive and Corporate Performance: Research Based on Marginal Diminishing Effect and Top Management Team of Chinese Listed Companies

在"第二类代理问题"占据主导和隐性激励大量存在的中国市场,上市公司高管看起来显著较低的薪酬和持股比例亦可能导致较为严重的过度激励。有别于先前多数有关高管激励的研究文献,本文不仅清晰展现了高管薪酬和股权激励存在的滞后效应;而且进一步在实证研究中证实高管薪酬和股权激励存在显著的边际递减效应和过度激励,即高管薪酬激励和股权激励与企业业绩间在表现为线性正相关关系的同时呈现左低右高的倒"U"形关系,薪酬和持股比例过低不利于激发高管努力工作改善企业业绩,但薪酬和持股比例过高亦可能导致高管过度激励,同样会对企业业绩造成损害。

In Chinese market with dominance of ＂the Second Agency Problem＂ and large existence of implicit incentive, apparently few compensation and shareholdings of top management may still lead to severe excessive incentive. Different from most former researches, the paper not only clearly shows delayed effect of compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management, but also finds significant marginal diminishing effect and excessive incentive of compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management in empirical analyses which results in an inverted U-shape relationship with a lower left wing and higher right wing between compensation incentive and ownership incentive for top management and corporate per- formance. That is to say, not only insufficient incentive because of too low top management compensation and shareholding proportion but also excessive incentive because of too high top management compensation and shareholding proportion impair corporate performance.