摘要
委托代理理论和博弈理论,将委托代理过程分成代理人的工作结果可完全由工作情况决定和不可以完全由工作情况决定两种情况,分别建立有不确定性但可监督的委托人-代理人动态博弈模型和有不确定性且不可监督的委托人-代理人动态博弈模型,分析委托代理双方在委托代理过程中各阶段的风险和收益,从而找出两种模型中双方的激励参与约束和激励相容约束,得出一系列的激励模式。
The principal - agent process can be divided into decision completely through work and cannot be solely decided by the work. The paper established the principal - agent dynamic game model that has uncertainty but can be supervised and principal - agent dynamic game model that has uncertainties but can not be supervised, and analyzed the risks and benefits in various stages of principal - agent process to identify both encourage participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraints of two kinds of models and derive a series of incentive models.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期56-61,共6页
Commercial Research
基金
江苏省教育厅基金项目
项目编号:06SJD790047
淮阴工学院科研基金项目
