摘要
建立健全经营者股权激励机制是深化国有企业改革和增强企业活力的重要途径之一,经营者持股、国家股股东(国有资本注资持股)和流通股股东(中小股东持股)具有不同的股权激励效果。其中经营者持股具有最强的激励功能,有利于改善公司绩效和提升公司价值;委托代理关系下的国有资本容易出现投资者主体缺乏保护机制的问题,进而扩大委托代理关系的距离以及信息的不对称程度,引发企业效率低下;在流通股股东的激励环境下,股权流动性分裂从根本上损害了上市公司股东之间利益的一致性,可能导致经营者持股和国家股的激励减弱。在总结前人研究成果的基础上,选择制造业机械、设备、仪表次类上市公司为研究样本,从实证的角度对上述问题进行了探索。
Establishing and perfecting the enterprise operator option motivation mechanism is one of the important ways that deepen the reform of state - owned enterprise and enhance the vitality of enterprise. The state - owned shareholder (holding state -owned capital injection) and the circulation stock shareholder (medium and small shareholderowned stock ) have different effects of stock option motivation in the operator - owned stock. And, the operator - owned stock has the strongest motivated function, and is advantageous to improve the enterprise achievements and promote the enterprise value ; state - owned capital under the principal - agent relationship is easy to present the question which investors lack the protection mechanism, expanding the distance of principal - agent relationship and the degree of information asymmetrical, and causing the low enterprise efficiency; under the environment of circulation stock shareholder motivation, the split of stock option fluidity has fundamentally harmed the uniform benefit among shareholders of listed companies, possibly weakening the motivation of the operator -owned stock and state -owned stock. On the basis of previous research, this paper sums up the results, chooses the machinery, equipment and measuring appliance of manufacturing industry of listed companies as the research samples, explores the above issues from the empirical point of view, and draws the conclusion.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期77-81,共5页
Commercial Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目<完善自主创新三层三维激励机制及对策研究>
项目编号:08BJY018
关键词
经营者
股权激励
公司价值
operator
stock option motivation
enterprise value