考虑政府补贴的再制造闭环供应链效率分析

Efficiency Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain with Government Subsidy

建立了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的再制造闭环供应链博弈模型,研究了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈下制造商和零售商的最优决策。研究分析了政府补贴前后闭环供应链的效率变化,并给出了政府基于社会福利最大化的最优补贴大小,得出了政府补贴之后废旧品回收数量G(b_r)及制造商和零售商的利润π_(M2)、π_(R2)较未补贴时提高,并与补贴大小成正比。

Based on game theory, the model of a closed-loop supply chain with product remanufacturing consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is established, where the optimal decision of each member is reached under the Stackellberg game led by the manufacturer. The change of efficiency before and after the addition of government subsidy is studied, and the optimal government subsidy based on maximum social welfare is given. Results indicate that the amount of recycled products and the revenue of each member of the closed-loop supply chain is bigger after the subsidy, and they are proportional to the magnitude of the subsidy.