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基于套牢的合资铁路融资困难博弈分析 被引量:1

Analysis Based on the Financing Difficulties of Locked-In Joint-Venture Railway
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摘要 以合资铁路建设过程中的参与人铁路局和外部资本所有者的履约行为为研究对象,分析套牢对双方投资决策的影响,可得出结论:考虑到合资铁路资产的专用性,一旦投入资产,铁路局的最优策略是选择"套牢";而为了规避被套牢,外部资本也会选择"不投资"。因此,尽管铁道部颁布了众多鼓励外部资本参与铁路建设经营的法规,而外部资本的积极性仍然不高。 By studying the performance of contract parties, the Railway Bureau and external capital holders, in joint-venture railway construction and analyzing the locked-in influence on investment decisions of both parties, we can conclude that: considering the specific assets the Railway Bureau should select " locked-in" as the most excellent strategy when it plans to invest in joint-venture railway construction. At the same time, to avoid being "locked-in", the external capitals would choose "not to invest". This explains, despite a number of issued regulations encouraging external capitals' participation in railway construction and operation, the enthusiasm of external capitals is not high.
出处 《西南交通大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2010年第1期53-55,共3页 Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)
关键词 铁路建设 项目融资 合资铁路 套牢 非公有制经济 外部资本 railway construction project financing joint-venture railway locked in nonpublic sectors of economy external capital
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