伽达默尔对启蒙运动的批判方式及其阐释学意义

Gadamer's Critique of Enlightenment and Its Significance in His Hermeneutics

伽达默尔对审美意识的批判已受到太多关注。鲜为人知的是,他对启蒙运动的批判是理解其本体论阐释学更有意义的部分。在他对启蒙运动的"笛卡尔基础"的批判上,本文深入地探讨了他对艺术的理解及其阐释理性观念之间的关系。与哈贝马斯等人的批评不同,本文认为伽达默尔的阐释学本质上不应在与启蒙事业严格对立的立场来解读。伽达默尔早期的对话观念本身最初因启蒙抱负而起,问题是伽达默尔最终没有持守这种抱负。他的传统观念因太过贴近描绘艺术体验的崇高忘我精神,而使得其阐释学牢牢嵌入一种启蒙承诺与反启蒙冲动的浪漫转向之间悬而未决的张力中。

Too much attention is focused on Gadamer＇s critique of aesthetic consciousness, but it is little known that his critique of Enlightenment is more important to understand his hermeneutics. Under his discussion of ＂the Cartesian basis＂ of the philosophical Enlightenment, This essay explores the relation between Gadamer＇s understanding of art and his notion of hermeneutic reason. Against the criticisms launched by Habermas, his hermeneutics should not be understood in strict opposition to the Enlightenment project as such. Gadamer＇s early notion of dialogue is itself fueled by enlightenment aspirations. The problem, however, is that Gadamer fails to live up to these aspirations. His notion of tradition moves too closely to the sublime self- forgetfulness that char- acterizes the experience of art, leads to an unresolved tension in Gadamer＇s hermeneutics, between enlightenment commitments and anti- enlightenment impulses.