高管限薪视角下的经理股票期权的研究

On the ESO in the View of "Institutional Unfair Interest"

经理股票期权是公司治理中对经营者进行股权激励的一种形式,它对于激励经营者关注公司的长远利益和持续成长有正面作用,因此为国内外上市公司广泛采用。但现行经理股票期权是一种徒具期权交易形式的"馈赠型期权"(免费的期权权利),其收益与风险完全不对称的特性使它不可避免地沦为公司高管攫取不当利益的工具。馈赠型经理股票期权存在股市系统性风险对个股价格的影响、收益和风险不对称、期权股份授予额度没有客观依据三大问题,应把馈赠型经理股票期权变革成"准交易型经理股票期权",使它在保留长期股权激励功能的同时,不致沦为公司高管攫取制度性不当利益的工具。

The ESO is a way of stock equity inspiration to the manager in corporate governance, as the ESO has the advantage of promoting the manager to concern the firm＇ s long period interest and growth,it has been widely applod for the listed companes. But, the actual ESO is becoming a type of ＂gratuitous option＂ （ cost - free option ） that only left the format of the ESO. It inevitably turns to a tool for senior executives to grasp at ＂institutional unfair interest＂ because of its character of asymmetry between profit and risk. There exists three kinds of problems：the effect to single stock＇ s price from the stock market＇ s systemetic risk;the asymmetry between profit and risk, and option amount to be awarded without objective evidences. The paper advocates to change the gratuitous ESO into ＂dealing -o- rientod ESO＂ ,in the mean while,it will keep inspiration function in long time as well as avoiding to be the tool for senior executives to grasp at ＂institutional unfair interest＂.