摘要
对于政府目标函数,新古典经济学将政府视为"慈善的专制者",而公共选择学派则偏重于对不同利益集团的考察,两者都只揭示了政府目标函数的某一部分的特性。以G-H模型为代表的"串谋型政府"模式将两者结合于自己的分析框架内,因而具有较强的政策博弈预测性。最后,对G-H模型进行的拓展研究表明,应不断加强政府自身的建设并尽量降低利益集团对贸易政策的影响权重。
As for the government objective function, the Ned-classic economics treat the government as a ＂benevolent dictators＂, while the public choice school emphasis the analysis of different interest groups, both of them only reveals part property of the Objective Function of Government. The model of ＂Collusive Government＂, represented by ＂G-H model＂, combines these two kinds in its analysis framework and shows good predictability on policy gaming. The analysis of an extended G-H model shows government should strengthen the construction of itself and decrease the influence weight of interest group to the trade policy.
出处
《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期140-144,共5页
Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science
基金
国家社科基金项目(07BJL042)
中南财经政法大学研究生教育创新基金资助项目(2008BJJ14)
关键词
目标函数
慈善型政府
掠夺型政府
串谋型政府
objective function
benevolent government
grabbing government
collusive government
