论《存在与时间》中此在的先验性

On the Transcendental Nature of Dasein in Being and Time

海德格尔在《存在与时间》中所追问的主题是存在的意义,或者说存在对我们来说如何成为一个问题的,为此海德格尔构建了他的基础存在学,通过对此在(Dasein)的生存论结构的现象学分析,海德格尔揭示了在世界中存在的此在是存在真理向我们敞开的可能性条件,此在因此作为理解的可能性条件对存在具有优先性,成为先验的,海德格尔对此并不满意。转向之后,海德格尔在追问存在意义的道路上从对此在的生存论分析转向了对存在本身的本质发生或本现(wesen)的描述,这一转向的意图之一就是为了避免此在的主体性、先验的取向,使得存在与此在相互归属,互为条件,但本有(Ereignis)的本现就彻底摆脱了先验论吗?这仍是一个有待于进一步探讨的问题。

In his Being and Time, Heidegger concentrates on how being becomes an issue for us, in other words, what makes it possible for the being of beings to mean something to us. The ＂fundamental ontology＂ he advances in Being and Time answers the question of how the temporality of Dasein serves as the transcendental horizon for human understanding of being. But Heidegger does not like the answer, because it aligns with Kantian transcendentalism. After Kehre, Heidegger tried to avoid the transcendental and subjective paradox of Dasein. In the 1930s, he changed his question of inquiry into being into ＂how does Seyn essentially happen？＂ where the emphasis is not on the structure but on the event. Heidegger thinks this new question can help avoid transcendentalism. Whether or not it really does awaits further exploration.