会计准则制定程序的博弈分析——以美国和欧盟为例

Game Analysis on Accounting Standard Setting Procedure——Taking EU & USA as An Example

近年来,政治行为已经成为会计准则制定过程中的一个重要议题。以美国和欧盟为例,从博弈论角度对会计准则制定过程中的政治过程进行深入分析,发现美国和欧盟的会计准则制定主体——FASB和IASB遵循一个极为相似的程序,但它们却被植入了截然不同的政治环境中。对于一个相似的新会计准则,即使两个会计准则制定主体有着极为相似的偏好,其结果也将迥然不同。

In recent years accounting researchers have identified political behavior as a significant issue for accounting standard setting. This paper presents a simple game-theoretic analysis of the political process. It shows that EU and USA set accounting standard in terms of a similar procedure. However, because of different political contexts, the setting procedure produces different outcomes.