上市银行高管股权激励设计——以招商银行为例

The Design of the Equity Incentive Mechanisms for the Listed Bank Executives

近年来,银行高管天价薪酬问题引起很大社会反响,西方国家正积极加强对银行高管年薪的管理和约束,我国政府部门也在不断努力,指导商业银行制定结构合理、水平适当、管理规范、激励约束相容的薪酬制度。上市银行高管薪酬一般由年薪和股权激励构成,年薪属于短期激励。本文以招商银行为例,介绍了股票增值权、限制性股票、股票期权这三种长期股权激励方法,就上市银行股权激励作用以及如何设计股权激励机制进行探讨。

In recent years, Bank executives＇ sky-high salary has caused great social repercussions. Western countries are actively strengthening and constraining bank executives＇ salary. China＇s government departments are also trying to guide commercial banks to develop a rational structure, the appropriate level, standardized management and an incentive/constraint compatible salary system. Bank executives＇ salary consists of the annual salary and equity incentive, the former being a shortterm incentive. This article takes the Merchant Bank of China as an example to illustrate the stock appreciation rights, restricted stock and stock options as long-term equity incentives and discusses the effects of the bank equity incentive and how to design stock incentive mechanisms.