货币政策与最优融资选择--一个基于公司治理因素视角的研究

Monetary Policy and Optimal Financing Decisions——Based on the Research of Corporate Governance

1998年,中国人民银行宣布取消信贷规模限额直接控制,宏观货币政策调控实体经济由直接方式向间接转变。本文利用中国制造业上市公司1998～2008年一季度的数据,在引入公司治理因素后,研究了货币政策对微观公司实体融资选择的异质性影响。结果表明,上市公司所有权差异显著影响公司的融资选择,在银行主导的资源配置模式下,货币政策的信贷传导渠道整体有效,但国有控股上市公司的融资行为支持关系信贷观,一定程度上弱化了货币政策的调控效力;上市公司的信息披露差异对公司融资选择影响显著,相对于单一上市公司而言,交叉上市公司对货币政策反应敏感,交叉上市公司融资行为支持绑定效应。总之,运用货币政策调控实体经济时,公司治理因素对于微观实体的融资反应行为影响显著。最后,针对研究结论并结合当前现实提出了相应的政策建议。

In 1998 the central bank （People＇s Bank of China） abandoned the national bank credit quota and modernized the operating procedures indirectly. In this article, we assemble data on manufacturing listed companies in China from 1998：1 -2008：1 to analyze the impact of monetary policy on capital structure of firms with different corporate governance characteristics. The findings suggest that： Firstly, the differences of ownership-structure can significantly affect companies＇ optimal financing decisions. The financing behaviors of the State-Owned-Enterprises （SOE） can be interpreted as evidence in support of the relationship lending view. Secondly, corporate governance characteristics do affect company＇ s financing response to monetary policy shocks. The financing behaviors of these Cross-Listed-companies can be interpreted as evidence in support of the legal bonding hypothesis. The study concludes by analyzing the broad policy implications of theses findings.