摘要
现有关于定向增发折价的研究均以2007年11月之前牛市期间增发公司为样本,样本量较小,本文以我国2006年5月至2008年底包含较完整市场周期间定向增发上市公司为样本,以更为科学的折价衡量方法研究发现,定向增发股票的折价较高。且控股股东和关联股东参与认购时,定向增发股票的折价率显著高于非控股股东和关联股东认购组,控股股东认购比例越高,折价率越高,大股东通过高折价转移财富的动机越强;当大股东认购比例与原持股比例差额越大时,折价率越高,大股东的利益输送程度越高。不过,只有当市场行情较好时控股股东和关联股东才能通过定向增发顺利实现其利益输送和财富转移的目的。
Previous researches on discounts for private placements (PPs) are based on sample before November 2007 when the market is booming. Based on PPs from May 8th 2006 to December 31th 2008 and a more scientific calculation method for discounts, we find that, discounts for PPs are much higher than those of public offering. And discounts for PPs associated with controlling shareholders and relevant shareholders are significantly higher than those with no controlling shareholders or relevant shareholders. The higher percentage the controlling shareholders prescribe, the higher the discounts, and the stronger the motivation of tunneling. What' s more, the higher the difference between the prescribe percentage of controlling shareholders and their holding percentage, the higher the discounts. These indicate that private equity placements may be one way of tunneling for controlling shareholders. But these exit only when the stock market is booming. That is, only then can the controlling shareholders and relevant shareholders realize tunneling by high discounts of private equity placements to themselves.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期144-151,共8页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"全球化条件下的流动性过剩理论及其对中国的启示"(07CGJ006)
北京市优秀教学团队项目"会计学专业系列课程教学团队"PHR200907203)
学科与研究生教育--工商管理(一级学科PXM2009_014212_078362)
关键词
定向增发
折价
利益输送
private placement (PP)
discount
tunneling