摘要
中国草原正在从"公地的悲剧"向"围栏的陷阱"发展,牧民一方面看到围栏造成的种种危害,而另一方面家家户户又身不由己地被迫围栏草原。本文分析了这种困境的根源,认为在目前不完善的管理制度环境下,草原退化是理性经济人抢占草原的饲草和水资源等无主租值行为的必然均衡结果,而其解决措施不是鼓励围栏到户,而是多样化的地方社区自主治理。
Nowadays, the dilemma of China grassland governance is becoming from the ＂tragedy of commons＂ to ＂fencing dilemma＂. On one hand, herders realize that fencing grassland householdly cause a lot of unexpected worse conse- quence; on the other hand, herders have to fence their grassland as soon as possible. The economic incentive of this puzzledom is that： under the unreasonable China grassland policy and management system, the equilibrium is the inevi- table grassland degradation by rational action of herders who competitive occupy the benefit of common forage and com- mon water resources in China grassland. The resolution of the phenomena should not be fencing grassland householdly, but regional diversified selfgovernance.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期10-17,共8页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"北方放牧草地基于生态系统的草畜平衡管理模式研究"(70663004)
关键词
治理
草原围栏
制度成本
经济租
governance
fenced grassland
institutional cost
economic rent
