中央与地方政府自主创新行为的博弈与合作

Analysis on the Game between the Governments in the Process of Innovation Implementation

国家自主创新战略实施进度和效果实际上很大程度上取决于地方政府的行为偏好和合作态度。通过对中央与地方政府就自主创新实施中动态博弈分析指出:分权化改革背景下形成的中央政府与地方政府在目标取向和行动上的差异加剧了政策博弈,结果给自主创新战略的实施造成了阻力。中央与地方政府自主创新行为的合作则必须协调、明确各级政府自主创新战略的具体职责;重塑地方政府政绩考核评价体系;构建激励相容、利益均衡的合作机制。

Implementary effectiveness of independent innovation strategy to some extent depends on the behaviors of local government and cooperation attitude. The paper makes analysis on the game between the central and local government in the process of independent innovation implementation. The results indicate that under the background of decentralization reform, difference on targets and behav- iors of central and local government results in policy game which holdbacks the implementation of independent innovation strategy, The solving approaches lie in three aspects： making clearing concrete responsibility among all levels of governments; optimizing local government achievements appraisal system; constructing cooperation mechanism of balanced benefit.