税企博弈模型的再研究

A Further Study on the Model of Taxation Bureau and Entrepreneur Game

本文以文[1]基础,在更一般条件下提出了税企博弈模型,得到新的骗税罚款系数公式.从理论上证明了税务机关对企业抽样检查与全面检查具有相同的经济效果.最后,给出建模应注意的几个问题.

On the basis of paper [1], this paper puts forward a game model between tax-ation bureau and entrepreneur under the more general condition. We get a new penalty coefficient formnlar for the entreprenenr's fraudnlent activity, and prove that taxation bu-reau's sampling inspection has the same economic effect as the ail inspection. In the end, we give out some points which we must pay attention to in modelling.