司法独立性与投资者保护法律实施——最高人民法院“1/15通知”的市场反应

Judiciary Independence and The Enforcement of Investor Protection Laws: Market Responses to the "1/15" Notice of the Supreme People’s Court of China

本文利用2002年1月15目最高人民法院颁布《关于受理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知》（简称“1／15通知”）这一事件，以那些存在虚假陈述或有虚假陈述嫌疑的上市公司为样本，采用事件研究法，实证考察了司法独立性对投资者保护法律实施的影响。我们将样本公司分为司法相对独立和相对不独立的两组公司。我们发现，在“1／15通知”颁布日前后几个交易日内，样本公司的市场反应显著为负；并且，与司法相对独立组公司相比，司法相对不独立组公司的负向市场反应程度更弱。这说明，投资者倾向于认为，“1／15通知”及与其相关的民事诉讼法律能够得到一定程度的实施，但地方政府对当地法院的影响降低了这些投资者保护法律得到实施的可能性。

Taking advantage of the issuance of the ＂Notice of the Supreme People＇s Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Acceptance of Cases of Disputes over Civil Torts Arising from False Statements in the Securities Market＂ （Hereafter ＂1/15 Notice＂） in China on January 15, 2002, this paper investigates the effects of judiciary independence on the enforce- ment of investor protection laws. The sample is comprised of listed firms engaged in actual or suspected false statements. We classify the firms into higher judiciary independence group and lower judiciary independence group depending on where their headquarters are located. We find that around the issuance of the ＂1/15 Notice＂, the stock price response of the sample firms is significantly negative＂ moreover, compared with the firms in the higher judiciary independence group, those in the lower judiciary independence group have less negative stock price response. The results indicate that investors tend to believe that ＂1/15 Notice＂ and its related investor protection laws are likely to be enforced to some extent, but the potential influence of local governments on local courts lowers the probability of the enforcement.