基金管理公司治理中的代理问题——一个过度交易的视角

Agency-problem in Fund Management Company Governance:In View of Excessive Trading

基金管理公司代理问题的研究是以基金作为一个交易的黑箱展开的,而对于在这个黑箱中存在的问题的探讨很少。本文以开放式股票型基金的定期报告数据作为研究对象,从过度交易对基金收益影响的角度分析基金管理公司的代理问题。研究发现,某些基金管理者的频繁交易并没有提高基金持有人的收益,过度交易在某种程度上损害了持有人的利益,导致了基金收益率的下降。

The studies on agency-problem in fund management company are on condition that funds exit as a trade ＂black box＂. But there is little argument on what happens in the box. Using the periodical reports of open-ended equity fund, this article analyses the agency-problem in fund management company in terms of excessive trading. The study found that some active fund managers cannot inerease the profit of fund holders, and exeessive tradings result in the decrease of the rate of return and do harm to fund holders＇ profit to some extent.