摘要
以洪湖湿地自然保护区的拆网政策为例,通过渔民的围网博弈过程,分析补贴在自然保护区自然资源管理过程中的作用。结果显示,由于自然保护区自然资源的公共物品特点,导致自然保护区陷入公地悲剧陷阱。一次性补贴在激励渔民放弃过度围网行为方面起到了重要的作用。但是就长期而言,由于自然保护区的公共物品特征仍然存在,渔民在生产决策过程中仍然有"搭便车"的可能,单纯采用补贴政策不仅不能起到有效的作用,反而会导致过度利用自然资源的行为更多地发生。从博弈分析来看,要完全避免自然保护区的公地悲剧,应当以补贴为基础,结合政府的严格管理,进行其他制度创新,以实现保护的长效激励机制。
Taking Honghu Wetland Natural Reserve as impact of subsidies on the management and protection an example, game of fishers during fish culture was modeled and the of the Natural Reserve was analyzed. Results showed that subsidy played important role in preventing over-fish culturing in a short time. But in a long run, it failed to protect the resource and reduplicate subsidies would even induce the destroying of natural resource. Natural reserve falls into the tragedy of commons due to their common property rights. To avoid the tragedy of commons, new kind of reform of management system is claimed.
出处
《环境科学与技术》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第3期189-194,共6页
Environmental Science & Technology
基金
华中农业大学科研启动基金
