国有企业的政府控制权转让研究

State-owned Enterprises' Government Control Right Transfer

本文以2003—2007年国有企业的股权转让数据为样本,考察了政府转让控制权的决策及控制权转让后的短期市场反应和中长期业绩表现。研究发现:(1)近几年来政府转让国有企业控制权的政治动机明显,而追求企业经营业绩的经济动机减弱,转让中倾向于保留规模大的和有战略意义的企业;(2)市场对国有股权转让事件总体上给出了积极评价,但因投资者能理性预期到政府转让控制权的政治顾虑,民营化带来的短期累积超额回报并不明显高于其他转让方式;(3)民营化确实提高了企业经营业绩,但终极控制权仍保留在政府内部的"换汤不换药"的控制权转让方式并没有显著改善企业业绩。尽管民营化带来了国企事后的业绩改善,但政府事前却因为政治顾虑而不存在把业绩不好的企业转让出去的明显倾向,这种逻辑不一致性折射出我国当前国有企业改革面临的困境。

Focusing on state-owned enterprises＇ government control right transfer events from 2003 to 2007, the article studies the Government＇s motives of control right transfer as well as the market response and the operating performance difference caused by various types of control transfer. The research draws the following conclusions ： （ 1 ） In recent years, political motives such as concerns for size and strategic industry are the main motives of property rights reform of state-owned enterprises, while economic motives are not obvious; （2）Market gives positive evaluation to state-owned enterprises＇ government control transfer events, but since investors can make a rational anticipation to the government control transfer driven by political purposes, thus the short-term cumulative abnormal return brought by privatization is not significantly higher than other types ; （3） Privatization of enterprises improves operating performance effectively, while the control transfer in which the ultimate control right still retained in the government does not lead to significant performance improvement. Although the privatization has improved the state-owned enterprise＇s ex-post performance, the government has not shown any tendency to privatize the enterprises with poor performance out of the concern of ex-ante political concerns. It is a difficult dilemma which Chinese government faces in the progress of state-owned enterprises＇ reform.