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多群体模型下策略集的进化稳定

The Evolutionary Stability of the Strategy Set under the Multi-population Model
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摘要 为了寻求策略在动力学下的进化稳定性,克服严格纳什均衡的缺陷,定义了一个纯策略弱优回应映射,得到了任意保号选择动力学,若面在纯策略弱优回应映射下是闭的,则它是渐进稳定的. In order to search for the evolutionary stability of the strategy in dynamics and overcome the shortcomings of the strict Nash equilibrium, a pure-strategy better reply correspondence is defined and random sign-preserving dynamics is obtained. If the face is closed under the pure-strategy better reply correspondence, then it is asymptotically stable in sign-preserving selection dynamics.
作者 张涛
出处 《五邑大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2010年第1期64-67,共4页 Journal of Wuyi University(Natural Science Edition)
基金 广西工学院硕士基金资助项目(院科字500563)
关键词 纯策略弱优回应映射 保号选择动力学 渐进稳定 pure-strategy better reply correspondence sign-preserving system dynamics asymptotical stability
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参考文献6

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  • 2BALKENBORG D, SCHLAG K H. Evolutionarily stable sets[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, 29: 571-95.
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  • 5WEIBULL J W. Evolutionary game theory[M]. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995.
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