新制度经济学视阈下的政府内部人问题及治理探析

Analyzing the Problem of Insiders’ Control in Government and Its Governance in View of New Institutional Economics

企业经营中内部人问题在政府治理中表现为公务员采取机会主义行为谋取制度所不允许的潜在利益。政府内部人控制问题是当前政府改革的难点。借助新制度经济学的方法,本文从委托方和代理方的不同效用目标、内部人的激励机制及监督机制方面分析了其成因,并提出解决政府内部人问题的治理路径。

Insiders＇ control leads to the consequence that the public servants take opportunistic actions to reap potential benefits against the current political system. This has been a tough problem in the course of government reform. In view of new institutional economics, the article analyzes the reasons for the formation of the problem in three aspects, namely, the different aims of the consignor and the agent, incentive and supervision mechanism for insiders. Then it puts forward some solutions to the issue of insiders＇control.