农民专业合作社委托—代理问题的分析——基于新型分成制度的视角

The Analysis of Principal-agent Problems in Peasant Specialized Cooperation——Based on the new share-cropping perspective

我国农民专业合作社的委托—代理问题与生俱来,它在阻碍合作社健康发展的同时,也降低了合作的效率。近年来,国内外学者对委托—代理问题进行了研究,相应地也提出了一些理论,其中机制设计理论的效用尤为突出。本文试图借鉴这一理论来研究农民专业合作社的委托—代理问题,并通过建立相应的分析模型,寻找实现激励相容的约束条件,最后提出相关的建议,即收益与成本共担的一种新型分成制度。

The principal - agent problem of farmers＇ professional cooperatives is inherent. This not only hinder the healthy development of cooperatives, but also reduces the efficiency of cooperation. In recent years, scholars at home and abroad are doing tireless research on principal -agent problems, correspond- ing propose a number of theories. The effeetiveness of the mechanism design theory is particularly promi- nent. This paper attempts to apply this theory to professional farmers cooperatives principal - agent prob- lem above and through the establishment of a simple model, looking to achieve incentive compatibility constraints, and finally make relevant recommendation.