产品成本内生化的企业定价选址博弈分析

A Game Analysis on Location-Price Choice Model with Endogenous Production Costs

运用三阶段博弈模型研究了双寡头厂商面对需求非对称、产品成本内生时的定价选址决策问题,并分别分析了供应商Nash谈判参数的变化对生产商均衡位置以及均衡利润的影响。研究发现,与产品成本外生的情形相比,供应商的存在改变了生产商的均衡位置。当某一供应商的相对谈判能力增强时,与之形成双边垄断关系的生产商就会远离其垄断市场,均衡利润将会减少,而竞争对手则会靠近其对应的垄断市场,均衡利润将会增加。两个生产商之间的均衡距离会随供应商谈判能力的增强而缩小。

The location-price choice of double oligarchs is investigated by using a three stage game when market demands are asymmetric and production costs are endogenous. The effect on the manufacturers＇ equilibrium locations and equilibrium profits are respectively ana- lyzed when we change the supplier＇ s Nash bargaining parameter. The results show that the presence of suppliers changes the manufactur- ers＇ equilibrium locations compared with the case of exogenous production costs. When one of the suppliers＇ relative bargaining strength increases, the manufacturers who has bilateral monopoly relations with it will locate far away from its served market and its equilibrium profits will decrease, while the manufacturers＇ opponents will locate close to its covered market and its equilibrium profits will increase. The equilibrium distance between the two manufacturers is decreasing with the supplier＇ s bargaining power.