摘要
电子商务环境下渠道冲突与和谐并存问题受到越来越多关注,利用Stackelberg博弈,在价格竞争与价格敏感需求条件下,构建零售商以创新投入降低其分销成本、制造商对其创新投入实施策略性补偿激励的双渠道供应链模型,研究发现策略性创新激励补偿能实现制造商与零售商收益的Pareto改进、实现消费者福利改进。
The issues on the coexistence friendly and conflict in the dual - channel supply chain have attracted more and more attention in E - commerce. As a consequence, it set up a model to analyze that the traditional retailer made investments in innovation to reduce the operating cost and the manufacturer made investment to compensate for the retailer in a dual - channel supply chain by Stackelberg game under the conditions of price competition and price sensitive demand. It demonstrated that the innovation incentive investment can realize the profits of the retailers and the manufacturer as well as customers Pareto improvement.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期6-12,共7页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目
项目编号:70571088
关键词
双渠道供应链
创新补偿
创新
dual -channel supply chain
subsidy incentive
innovation
