基金经理激励:关于委托投资组合管理研究的评述

The Incentive of Fund Managers: A Survey about Delegated Portfolio Management

证券投资基金是委托投资组合管理的一种重要形式。基金经理作为基金运作的核心人物,很大程度上决定着基金业绩及投资人的利益,因此基金经理激励是基金委托组合管理制度的内在要求。本文综述了与基金经理激励相关的委托投资组合管理研究四个方面的内容,包括基金经理投资行为的解释、基金经理激励的线性激励契约特征的研究、对称与激励费用契约对经理人风险选择的影响研究以及相对业绩对基金经理风险承担行为的影响研究,并针对目前研究中存在的问题,提出今后应更加注重其投资行为的影响机理及相关基金管理机制的研究。

Securities investment fund is an important form of delegated portfolio management. Fund managers are the core of the fund, who largely determine the fund performance and the interests of investors. Therefore, the incentive of fund managers is the internal demand of delegated portfolio management system. This paper reviews the following four aspects of delegated portfolio management concerning the incentive of fund managers： the explanation of investment behavior of fund managers, the characteristics of the linear incentive contract of fund managers, the influence of symmetrical and incentive fee to the risk selection of fund managers and the effect of relative performance to the risk-taking of fund managers. Finally, the paper discusses the problems of the present studies, noting that the research should focus on the influence mechanism of fund managers＇ investment behavior and the research of related fund management mechanisms.