摘要
将港口外部性和兼容性引入发货人效用函数,通过拓展线性的豪泰林模型研究新建港口位置选择、港口使费竞合博弈,研究表明:若实施非合作博弈,则新建港口选址将趋于集中,甚至出现"越界"恶性竞争,港口最优使费与服务质量成正比而与到目的港距离成反比;若实施合作博弈,则新建港口选址将趋于分散,采用差异化策略,港口间最优使费差异与其服务质量差异、网络外部性强度成正比,而与到目的港距离之差、兼容程度成反比。
Through introducing network externality and compatibility to utility function of the shipper, then establishing linear extensive Hotelling model researches location selecting of a new port, co-competition game of port disbursement. The finding is that excessive competition will be appeared when non-coopera- tive game is implemented, port^s best disbursement is in proportion to service quality, but is in inversely to the distance from the port to destination; Furthermore, comparing port＇s difference in location and dis- bursement under cooperative game.
出处
《交通科技与经济》
2010年第2期122-124,共3页
Technology & Economy in Areas of Communications
基金
上海市科技发展基金软科学研究计划项目(09692102700)
关键词
豪泰林模型
位置选择
港口使费
效用函数
博弈策略
Hotelling model
location selecting
port disbursement
utility function
game stategy
